On the effectiveness of the Hague Convention in protecting Cultural Property

Currently the principle piece of international legislation on Cultural Property Protection (CPP) is the Hague Convention (1954) along with its first (1954) and second (1999) protocols (Stone 2013: 166). The original Convention was guided by the principles of the Washington Pact of 1935 and built on the recognition that, during World War II, a huge amount of CP had “suffered grave damage during recent armed conflicts and that, by reason of the developments in the technique of warfare, [cultural properties are] in increasing danger of destruction” (UNESCO 1954). The clear intention of the Convention was “to ensure that such losses of cultural heritage during war would never again occur” (Wegener & Otter 2008). It gave a wide definition of CP, covering anything from large buildings and archaeological sites to individual artefacts, books, archives and artworks; anything that is important in some way to the cultural heritage of every person.

Despite these intentions, the next 40 years has seen the destruction of more CP. The 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia led to a desire for a complete review of the Hague Convention, particularly in terms of its focus on measures to be carried out in peacetime rather than during conflict when it may already have become too late to protect cultural property (Wegener & Otter 2008). This resulted in the 1999 protocol. The 21st century has seen significant new threats to CP: the looting of museums and archives, and the damage and destruction of ancient monuments and historic sites at the hands of terrorists, with the ancient World Heritage sites of Palmyra in Syria and Nimrud in Iraq being the most recent victims to gain the attention of the world media (Shaaban 2016). During the Coalition’s occupation of Iraq, beginning in 2003, deliberate theft and destruction took place at the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad (Figure 1) with 15 000 objects taken from the archives. Although any loss of CP is of huge regret, the pre-conflict focus on forward planning through the Hague Convention and its protocols, along with the awareness and foresight of museum staff, resulted in large amounts of displayed artefacts and objects being removed and/or hidden before the armed conflict that followed the U.S. invasion. Thankfully, the initial prediction of loss reported by western media was found to be vastly overestimated (Paroff 2004: 2021).

Figure 1 — To minimise the risk of unintentional or collateral damage to CP, staff at the National Museum of Iraq painted the Blue Shield symbol on the roof in 2003.

Based on the evidence from the National Museum of Iraq, it appears that the guidelines laid out in the Convention went some way to preserve heritage. However, the neglect and ill-preparedness of the invading powers were at the root of the problem. At the time, many in the international community questioned the US’s legal and ethical grounds for failing to provide timely protection to the museum (Paroff 2004: 2022). Following their invasion of the region in 2003, no foot soldiers in active combat had orders to protect heritage and no CP sites were marked on combat maps as places to safeguard and avoid collateral damage. Furthermore, there were less than 10 CP experts within the entire 130 000+ strong coalition forces, and none in the forward force that was sent in first, clear evidence of the low priority given to CP by those planning the invasion. Paroff points the finger at the current laws in place: “International attempts to protect cultural property have not immunised museums from looting and destruction” (Paroff 2004:2022), yet it is clear that an alteration in the consideration of CPP by military and governmental powers is also needed.

A similar lack of links between threats to CP and the wider political and military situation is illustrated in the more recent looting at the hands of Islamic State (IS) militants in Syria (Figure 2). With a 20% tax on any exchanges within the sale of illicit antiquities (Cox 2015) it is claimed that IS had raised $36 million from selling artefacts from the single site of al-Nabuk, to the west of Damascus (Watson 2015). Here is a complex combination of issues requiring urgent attention: current legislation is inadequate, the military have failed to carry out effective monitoring, and the international CPP community is not being heard. This is a clear example of how the demands of the CPP professional, who wants to see the secure protection of artefacts, and the military, who want to stop huge funding to the enemy through illegal trade, could work together.

Figure 2 — Satellite image of the same area of land before and after extensive looting at the archaeological site of Mari, Syria, before and after ISIS took control. The red squares highlight looters’ pits.

The Four Tier Approach

Having experienced at first hand the multiple problems described above in trying to protect CP in Iraq following the Allied invasion, Professor Peter Stone suggested that a more wide-ranging 4-tier approach, based on co-operation between CP experts, governments and the military at all stages was needed:

Tier 1: long-term awareness training
Tier 2: specific pre-deployment training
Tier 3: behaviour during conflict
Tier 4: post conflict actions

(Stone 2013: 173–174)

Tiers 1 and 2 focus on raising awareness of the significance of CP as a source of national pride, dignity, well-being and economic potential, first in general and then in preparation for a specific conflict. Tier 3 deals with the behaviour of military forces during a conflict and Tier 4 is concerned with dealing swiftly with conservation issues arising from the conflict.

As evidenced above, much of the original legislation referred to pre-war preparations “in times of peace” (UNESCO 1954), with few if any recommendations for post-war actions, even though these can be crucial to the conservation and long-term survival of CP. At the National Museum of Iraq, for example, most staff had little or no advanced conservation knowledge — because United Nations sanctions on Iraq had prevented them from receiving training. They therefore lacked the professional skills to conserve artefacts in dire need of attention (Figure 3)(Wegener & Otter 2008). This is an example where the implementation of the earlier stages in Stone’s 4-tier approach could have been hugely beneficial to the retention and preservation of CP.

Figure 3- A member of staff from The National Museum of Iraq pointing to the shattered remains of cultural property.

His proposed tier 4 focuses specifically on the “repair, and conservation required to mitigate any damage inflicted by the conflict” (Stone 2013: 174). Part of the motivation for this fourth tier is the bureaucracy faced by cultural heritage professionals desperate to volunteer their assistance following post-war destruction and looting. At the National Museum of Iraq many of those willing to help deal with artefacts in need of conservation were denied entry because they were not part of an NGO or an official member of their country’s state team. The application of this post-conflict tier would facilitate dialogue between the parties — the local experts, the international community and the military.

However, better communication between the parties during and after conflict also raises ethical and political challenges within the heritage community. Cooperation on these matters between archaeologists and military personnel is considered by some to be too narrow: they should speak about not just the loss of CP but about all the injustices and inefficiencies arising from conflict. Hamilakis criticised the “military-archaeological complex” for reinforcing the view amongst affected communities that CPP is just a means of Western imperialism justifying its invasion of the area (Figure 4)(Hamilakis 2009: 43). Others have echoed this view, stating that the destruction of antiquities “cannot be compared with the destruction of human lives caused by the wars in Syria and Iraq” (Bauer 2015:2) Despite these ethical issues, there are surely huge benefits to be had from generating dialogue and understanding between those involved in conflict areas. Stone is keen to stress that throughout the 4-tier approach the priority given to the safeguarding of CP through dialogue, training programmes and education curriculum will have far-reaching, positive outcomes for the future of a country and its people — not just for the military and western powers involved. For example, promoting the re-emergence of tourism at neglected World Heritage sites by conserving the CP could provide much needed help to the country’s economy (reducing the need for continued civilian looting), regulate the antiquities market and encourage enough local stability for Western military occupiers to withdraw. From a military perspective, this economically-driven approach to getting soldiers ‘into theatre’ and out again is only possible through the stabilisation of that country following the end of conflict.

Figure 4 — A helicopter from the US Army Camp Alpha with bulldozed remains from Babylon in the foreground. The military caused avoidable collateral damage to CP by expanding 150 hectares inside the ancient Mesopotamian city.

Effectiveness of the Hague Convention and protocols

Many of the above examples of loss, damage and destruction of CP are the result of awareness and short-sightedness by those with power, which Stone has called an “outrageous abdication of responsibility — mainly on the part of politicians” (Stone 2009: 35). These problems are not always the fault of the Convention. Inconsistencies of approach continue: without any proposals to change international law and the ongoing refusal to ratify the Convention, the UK recently announced a £3 million fund toward CPP in Iraq over the next 5 years (DCMS 2015).

However, if we are assessing effectiveness of the Convention in terms of its impact in bringing perpetrators to justice, then it has to be seen as ineffective. There has never been a prosecution in an international court of law under the Convention or its protocols. To avoid the issues that result from the destruction and looting of CP, during and after conflicts there needs to be greater emphasis not only on Stone’s “military awareness training” (Stone 2013: 170) but also on access by heritage professionals. Given the problems arising from UNESCO bureaucracy around CP professionals being denied entry to the country in post-conflict scenarios, and untrained museum/heritage staff being unsure what procedures to take, governments and their military should recognise and implement the Blue Shield list of available specialists. Alongside the training programmes for heritage staff that Blue Shield already operates, the list provides a go-to sample of recommended specialists to be consulted following the end of conflict, and emphasises the benefits of returning responsibility for CP back to local authorities as soon as possible. This is clearly missing from the Convention and highlights the advantages of implementing Stone’s 4th tier, with its focus on rapid stabilisation and conservation through dialogue (Stone 2013: 174).

Evidence suggests that the 4 tier approach would be significantly more effective and has the potential to avoid what has happened in Iraq and Syria. It would, however, need to be properly implemented with a government and military willing to seek expert advice by engaging with CPP specialists, NGOs and communities. Both the Italian and British governments have recently announced plans to create specific CPP taskforces of professionals within the military, in order to combat the rapid loss of heritage at the hands of ISIS (D’Emilio 2016)(DCMS 2015). This will entail greater dialogue between the military and heritage professionals. With this wider recognition of the significance and value of protecting CP during and after armed conflict, it is hoped that more effective controls, based on the 4 tier approach, can be put in place.

Bauer, A (2015) Editorial: The Destruction of Heritage in Syria and Iraq and Its Implications, International Journal of Cultural Property (22),1–6

Cox, S (2015) The men who smuggle the loot that funds IS, BBC News 17/02/15 (online) available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31485439

DCMS, (2015) New scheme to protect cultural sites from destruction, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (online) available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-scheme-to-protect-cultural-sites-from-destruction

D’Emilio, F (2016) Italian task force aims to keep art, artefacts safe from extremists abroad, CBC News 17/02/16 (online) available at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/arts/italy-unesco-task-force-cultural-protectors-1.3452239

Hamilakis, Y (2009) The ‘‘War on Terror’’ and the Military–Archaeology Complex: Iraq, Ethics, and Neo-Colonialism, Archaeologies: Journal of the World Archaeological Congress Vol 5 (1), 39–65

Paroff, S (2004) Another Victim of the War in Iraq: The Looting of the National Museum in Baghdad and the inadequacies of international protection of Cultural Property, Emory Law Journal 53 2021–2054

Shaaban, B (2016) The Rise of ISIS and Other Extremist Groups: the role of the West and Regional Powers, Wordpress (online) available at: http://tinyurl.com/jkxj5ew

Stone, P (2009) Protecting Cultural Heritage in Times of Conflict: Lessons from Iraq, Archaeologies: Journal of the World Archaeological Congress, 32–38

Stone, P (2013) A four-tier approach to the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Antiquity, 87, 166–177

UNESCO (1954) Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, UNESCO (online) available at: http://tinyurl.com/y4565v

Watson, A (2015) Islamic State and the ‘Blood Antique’ Trade, BBC (online) available at: http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20150402-is-and-the-blood-antique-trade

Wegener, C & Otter, M (2008) Cultural Property at War: Protecting Heritage during Armed Conflict, Conservation Perspectives 23.1, (online) available at: http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_resources/newsletters/23_1/feature.html